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It is common to introduce a neglected historical source at a confe
rence; Iwant todosomethingalittledifferentand introduceaneglec
ted group of people – the localmilitary population of Iran in the late
Mongol and the Timurid period. We know that Iranian troops were
widely used during the Mongol period, and we also know that under
the Timurids the local military of Iran took part in most large cam
paigns andmanyminor ones, but these troops andmost of their com
manders have remained shadowy figures. There has been little study
of the character and makeup of the military population or of their
impact on political dynamics. In this paper I will not go beyond a
beginning; I will introduce a few examples of military figures and
attempt a preliminary characterization of the military classes of Iran,
suggestingsomewaysinwhichtheyinfluencedpolitics.
Our problem in understanding local military personnel stems from
the conventions of the sources at our command. Medieval historians
portrayed society according to the divisions prevalent in PersoIslamic
theoretical and advice literature, which sharply divided “men of the
sword” from “men of the pen”. During theMongol and Timurid per
iod, when the ruling class consisted of Mongols and Turks comman
ding a large nomad army, this divide was characterized along ethnic
lines: a TurcoMongolian military class, with a PersoIslamic elite




torians originated from either the ulama or the bureaucracy and had a
strong bias in favor of their own kind. It is these classeswho emerge
most fully and vividly from the collections of biographies and local
historieswhichformmajorsourcesforsocialandregionalhistory.The
military classes figure primarily in the dynastic court historieswritten
for rulers, and only themost powerful commanderswithin the ruler’s
entourageachievesignificantcharacterization.
The local military elites, those outside the TurcoMongolian follo
wing of the ruler, appear clearly only under special circumstances,
when no superior central power covered their activities. They are
mentioned, though rarely well described, in the histories of local
independent dynasties, such as the rulers of Sistan, theMozaffarids of
Kerman andFars, and theKarts ofHerat.There are twowayswe can
use the histories of these dynasties for our purposes. One way is to
examine the history of their founders, whose stories provide telling
vignettesof localpolitics.Another is tousehistorians’accountsof the
disorders at the end of Ilkhanid rule. Local commanders achieved
prominence when central rule collapsed, and the rivalries of smaller
dynasties in Iran gave scope and opportunity to local military adven
turers.When central rule is reimposed, the histories once again confi
ne their activities to themargin, and politics again belong to the ruler
and his military entourage, upheld by Persian bureaucrats and
notables, a vision which has been followed by modern historians of
the period2. To achieve amore detailed understanding of the relations
between government and society under the Mongols and the




iod.Thesewere foundedby the sword, by peoplewho arose from the
local elites servingunder theMongols, and it seems logical to assume
that for each personwho rose to a position of rule, other similarmen
must have continued to be active at a lower level. Among dynastic
founders we find people of a variety of ethnic origins, some moving
to new areas where opportunities opened up, others remaining within
their region of origin. The dynasties of southern Iran offer us
examplesof this first type.The InjuiddynastyofFars (c. 13031357),

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was founded by Sharaf alDin MahmudShah, who claimed descent
from the great 11thcentury theologian and mystic ‘Abdallah Ansari
of Khorasan. Sent to Fars originally by the Ilkhan Öljeytü to admi
nister the royal estates, Sharaf alDin succeeded over time in seizing
power over much of the region for himself and his family3. The
Mozaffarid dynasty of Kerman and Fars belonged to a Khorasanian
family of Arab descent, which retreated to Kerman on the Mongol
invasion. The family settled in Maybod and various of its members
served under Hülegü. Its rise began when the founder of the family
fortunes, Sharaf alDin Mozaffar, was appointed to guard the region
against robbers. His son Mobarez alDin Mohammad served at the
Ilkhanid court in his youth, then returned to his family’s region on
Oljeytü’s death and began to expand his power, taking Yazd from its
Atabeg, fighting the unruly Negüderi Mongols, and increasing his
power at the expense of the Inju family4. Like the Injuids, the
Mozaffarids rose through a combination of service to the Ilkhans and
localmilitary activity, and then, profiting from the collapse of central
government, they achieved independence, which they held until
defeatedbyTimur(Temür).
The rulers of Kerman under the Mongols represented a different
type of military actor – the remnants of the Turkic ruling class
pushed out by the Mongols. These were the QutlughKhanid or
QaraKhitay dynasty, founded in 1222 by Baraq Hajib, a Qara
Khitay who had served ‘Ala’ alDin Mohammad Khorezmshah5.
Like the Injuids and Mozaffarids, they were able to make use of
Mongol overlordship to carve out local power for themselves in a
region to which they were foreign. Another commander from the
realm of theKhorezmshahs, Taj alDin InalteginKhorezmi, moved to
the south where he became involved in local struggles and founded a
minordynastyinFarah6.
Several local dynasties of the Mongol period originated from the
Iranian seminomadic and tribal populations which maintained their
military character throughout Arab and Mongol rule. This was the
casewith the dynasty of Shabankara,which arose before theMongols
and lasted under their domination until the disturbances at the end of
the Ilkhanid period. The Shabankara rulers based their power on a
peripheral region of Fars with a pastoralist economy. They were
themselves Iranian and claimed descent from the Sassanian dynasty,

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but their population and armies were heterogeneous; the districts
they controlled held both Arab and Turkmen nomads. When they
went to war they commanded troops from the local population, aug
mented by Turkic slaves. Like a number of other contemporary
dynasties they cemented their position through marriage with the
Mongolelite7.
In Khorasan we find two dynasties representing different seg
ments of the local population. TheKartid dynasty of Herat was simi
lar to that of Shabankara in its dependence on a semipastoralist
nomad population. The Karts enjoyed an obscure origin; they were
Tajiks claiming descent from the Seljukid sultan Sanjar, and closely
connected to the Ghurid population of the mountain regions, who
formed a significant part of their armies. The ancestors of their epo
nymous founder rose to prominence in the service of the Ghurid
dynasty, for whom they governed the region of Herat. When the
Mongols arrived theKartid leader quickly paid his respects and obtai
ned apatent for the region,withpermission to reconquer it.After this
he and his successors ruledHerat for theMongols and served conspi
cuouslyintheirarmies,withlocaltroops8.
The Sarbadar movement of Sabzevar which achieved prominence
inKhorasan on the collapse of the Ilkhanidswas also of local origin.
This beganwith ‘Abd alRazzaq b. FazlallahBashtini and his brother,
identifiedaslocalamirsandgreatmenofBashtinnearSabzevar.They
organized first a rebellion and then a band of brigands, consolidating
their power by serving as allies or agents of nearby Mongol powers.
They soon found other sources for their military manpower and sup
port in the Shi’ite “darvish” organization, controlling armed follo
wers, presumably futûwwa groups, and the landed aristocracy from
Sabzevar. These three groups formed the central leadership of the
Sarbadars up to Timur’s conquests, and their rivalry for power lay
behind many of the dynasty’s vicissitudes. The common soldiers at
their command included a motly group of adventurous young men:
exsoldiers,futûwwagroupsandTurkicghulams9.
Whatweseewhenweputallthesestoriestogetherisnotasetofear
lier dynasties survivingwith difficulty under foreign rule, but a group
of activemen taking advantage of new conditions to carve out power
for themselves. Some came from local families; othersmoved to new




tunities opened by Mongol rule to rise to new prominence and
power10.It isnotclearindeedhowimpermeablealineweshoulddraw
betweenthemilitaryandbureaucraticelitesofIran.Certainlyweknow
ofvizierswhoservedasgovernorsor fortresskeepers forpartof their
careers,andbureaucratsarementionedinbattle,leadingtroops11.
Once rulershadachieved localpower they thenhad tokeep it, and
this involved not only maintaining good relations with their over
lords, but also controlling themilieu fromwhich they themselves had
arisen.We should not let the spectacular traumas of TurcoMongolian
rule blind us to the continuing contentiousness of local populations.
Thehistoriesof localdynasties,howeverbrief,make it clear that local
rulers manoeuvred within a politically active society with widely dis
seminated military power. The history of Sistan shows an endless
seriesofuprisingsby theholdersof regional fortresses,whohad tobe
subdued or placated by each ruler in turn. When they could not
manage to do this on their own, the kings of Sistan turned to outside
powers for help, as did their rivals12. The accession of a new ruler
often depended on the choice of candidates made by notables and
amirs13. The leadingmen of Shabankara, when the last of their rulers
had been killed, invited in another branch of the dynasty from
Isfahan, but according to one source thesemen, having heard that the
notables and amirs of Shabankara had been consistently faithless
towardstheirformerrulers,refusedtotakeoverleadership14.
We have another good opportunity to study local military figures
in the accounts of the political activity in Iran at the time of Timur’s
rise topower.Atthis time, thedynasties Ihavementionedabovewere
competing for men and territory, along with several new Turco
Mongolian dynasties filling the vacuum left by the Ilkhans. The rival
ries of these states gave scope to the ambitions of local commanders,
some of whom appear quite prominently in the histories. When we
look at thesemen the first thing that strikes us is their heterogeneity.
We find a wide variety of both ethnic group and social or occupatio
nal class.Among the peoplewho camevoluntarily intoTimur’s servi
cewith personal troops therewere amirs ofMongol background, such
asSaru ‘Adel (Sâru ‘Âdel),descended fromagroup formedbyAbaqa
Khan as helpers to the palace troops. He had started out in charge of
the sheepenclosure atBaghdad,andworkedhiswayup in the service

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of the Jalayirid amirs to a position of enormous power – sufficient to
be dangerous to the dynasty and thus to him15. Another was
EskandareSheykhi, of theprincely lineageofAmol,whohadembar
ked on a career of military adventure after his father had been depo
sed, andeventually joinedTimurwith1000men16.Wealso findseve
ralamirsfromKhorasanleavingtheserviceoftheKartstojoinTimur.
The rulers and commanders mentioned above represent a variety
of people, at quite different levels of power. The sources as usual are
unreliable on numbers of troops, but give a few hints. We find Saru
‘Adel at the head of a sizeable force of 17 qoshun,while Eskandare
Sheykhi led a personal following of 1000 horsemen17. Where the
figures of troops commanded by the Sarbadars are mentioned, they
number from one to three thousand, probably largely footmen. The
troops under the command of the rulers of the Sistan seem to have




is more striking is their mobility. There seems to have been conside
rablemovement up and down the social scale, andwemight see this
class as another conduit for social mobility in the medieval Middle
East. This should not surprise us, as the active and cutthroat dynas
ties of Iran clearly offered both opportunity and danger to local hol
ders of power.We find the spectacular rise of relativelyminor figures
either through their own initiative, as in the case of theBashtini foun
ders of the Sarbadar state, or through favor from rulers and clever
manoeuvring within their service, as with the Kartid and Mozaffarid
dynastic founders under the Ilkhans, and Saru ‘Adel under the
Jalayirids.We also find examples of mobility downward, in the mur
der and dispossession of the numerous amirs who landed up on the
losing sides of battles. There were other less dramatic ways in which
fortunesof thisclass roseand fell.Oneof the livesofShahNe’matal
lah Kermani recounts the story of Nezam alDin Kiji, a military man
from the region of Kij andMakran, many of whose men had left his
following to follow the governor of Kerman. He came into the pro
vince with his remaining troops planning on revenge, but meeting up
with Shah Ne’matallah, instead joined his order and distributed his

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goods among his armed followers, whom he released20. We also find
some vignettes of the landed gentry class from which many military
men arose. Esfezari recounts the story of aman living alone in a rui
ned fortress previously belonging to relatives, who was accompanied
now only by crows he had trained to hunt. When the Timurid ‘Abd
alQasem Babor (r. Khorasan c. f45057) met him, he asked what
favour hewould like and granted his request that the fortress be atta
ched to him21.We find accounts of the ruin of local landlords in Sufi
lives,whichmightexplainwhatlaybehindthisstory22.
What is much more extreme is the geographical mobility of many
military men of Iran.When we look for instance at the career of the
MongolSaru ‘Adel,we findhim startinghiscareer inBaghdad,under
the Jalayirids, but after the rise of SoltanAhmad after 1382, his arro
gance and power proved too great a threat, and he soon transferred
into the service of theMozaffarids, always glad to receive amirs from
outside. By the time Timur took over northern Iran in 7867H., Saru
‘Adel had become disillusioned about his prospects in Fars, and scen
ting a new opportunity, he sent an agent to sound out Timur’s entou
rage.Hisadvancewaswellreceived,andheswitchedallegianceagain,
for which he was rewarded by the governance of Tabriz and
Soltaniya23.EskandareSheykhihadanevenliveliercareer,leavinghis
region for Firuzkuhwhen his father lost his position, then about 1374
moving to Khorasan where he joined one of the dissident Shi’ite lea
ders of Sabzevar,DarvishRokn alDin, in an attempt at power.When
this failed, Rokn alDin fled to the welcoming Mozaffarids in Fars,
and Eskandare Sheykhi to the Kartids, who received him well and
gave him governorship first of Fushanj and then of Nishapur. When
Rokn alDin returned to Khorasan accompanied by a Mozaffarid
force, he succeeded in taking Sabzevar and several neighboring for
tresses, and Eskandare Sheykhi was quick to join him. They were
soon attacked by most of the local dynasties; Rokn alDin attempted
flight but was captured and killed, while Eskandare Sheykhi again
returnedtotheKarts,whoforgavehim24.
The Kartids, probably the strongest and most stable of the
Khorasanian dynasties, had attracted and welcomed several adventu
rous amirs into their service.AsTimur’s fortunes rose, he also served




someone likely to switch allegiance. Sharaf alDin ‘Ali Yazdi reports
that when Timur conquered Herat in 1381, he held Eskandare
Sheykhi back from the rest of the Kartid emissaries in order to ask
information about the internal situation of Herat25. Another amir left
Kartid service even earlier to join Timur; this was Sheykh b. Da’ud
b.Khitatay,whosefamilyappearstohaveservedtheKartidsasgover
nors andmilitary commanders for at least one generation before him.
When Timur invaded Khorasan in 1381, Sheykh b. Da’ud was with
him and was rewarded with the governorship of Esfezar26. These
militarymenwere not simply living in their own regions and serving
whatever rulers took them over, but moving from one region or state
to another to find a more advantageous situation. Ambitious men did
not necessarily wait until they were in straits before moving; several
of the Kartid amirs who left to serve Timur did so well before his
invasionofKhorasan27.
Thepoliticalimpactoflocalamirs
We should consider what impact these amirs had on the political
picture in Iran. First of all we should recognize that the territorial
ambitions of local dynasties and the frequent movement of amirs
from one master to another meant that the postIlkhanid states of
Iran all contained significant numbers of outside people. To illustrate
this we can look at the military personnel of two of the larger and
more explicitly Iranian dynasties who followed the Mongols in 14th
century Iran: the Karts of Herat and the Mozaffarids of Fars. Both
expanded their territories at the expense of neighboring powers, and
the list of the groups they ingested is instructive. The Kartids had in
their armies Tajiks, Khalaj Turks, Baluch and Ghurids, and, when
they absorbed central Khorasan, they brought into their service
among others some of the descendants of Kadbugha Noyan, and
some Mongol Negüderi28. As we have seen, they were also welco
ming toEskandareSheykhi.We likewise find in their service renega
de darvishes from the Sarbadars, Darvish Amir Kamal alDin and
DarvishMohammad Hendu, to whom they gave charge of the border
fortressFarhadjerd29.
The Mozaffarids held the region of the Jurma’i and Awghani
Mongols of Kerman, a local grouping apparently descended from
troops whom the Ilkhan Arghun had appointed to the Qutlugh
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Khanids of Kerman for border defense. These were a troublesome
population, constantly in rebellion despite a marriage alliance with
the royal house. Nonetheless those not killed in reprisal continued to
serve prominently in the Mozaffarid armies30. The dynasty also had
under its control a less troublesome group of Mongols from Kerman
known as “Nowruzi”, and some of theMongol amirswho had served
the Injuids of Shiraz and entered theMozaffarid forces on the defeat
of their former masters31. In addition to these, we know of several
Khorasanian amirs in their service, with some Khorasanian troops.
The Mozaffarids were consistently welcoming to the dissident amirs
of their rivals. From the Jalayirids they took in the powerful amir of
Hamadan, Pir ‘Ali Badak, as well as Saru ‘Adel, and from the
Sarbadars, Darvish Rokn alDin. During their last year, the rebellious
SarbadaramirMolukSabzevaridesertedTimur’sservicefortheirs32.
What we see then is a varied and a shifting military population,
many of whom moved back and forth between different states accor
dingtoinclinationandadvantage.Therewasnodefiniteethnicstratifi
cationhere;MongolamirssometimesservedaboveIranians,andsome
timesbelow, and,wemust assume,often simply alongside.Almostno
group was totally without military activity; the Shi’ite darvishes of
Sabzevar,openlyandconsistentlyleadingtroops,mayhavebeenatone
endofthescale,buttheyareneithertheonlyreligiousfigurestoappear
in military activity, nor are their armed city followers unusual. It is
known that Sufi orders sometimes engaged in military activity, and
indeedwefindShahNe’matallahKermani’sson,KhalilallahNe’matal
lahi,joiningbattleinIndia.Consideringthis,thepresenceofNezamal
DinKiji as aprominentdiscipleof theorder, and thepresencealsoof
another military figure, Baba Mohammad Baghdadi, supposedly a
member of the Jalayirid dynasty, may take on significance33. As we
haveseen,membersofthebureaucracymightalsoleadtroops.
The men who switched allegiance so freely were adventurers, and
if they succeeded in gaining influence over their patrons, it was often
in encouraging them towards conquest. We find Rokn alDin encou
raging the Mozaffarids to attempt power in Khorasan, and Pir ‘Ali
BadakgoingagainstBaghdad to take itawayfromhis formermasters,
the Jalayirids, for the Mozaffarids34. As followers themselves, such
adventurers left something to be desired. Large numbers of the men
who joined Timur for advantage rebelled; indeed such rebellions

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punctuated his reign at fairly regular intervals, though they seem to
have done him little harm. Sheykh b. Da’ud b. Khitatay, who had
deserted the Karts for Timur and had participated in the conquest of
Khorasan, led a rebellion in Esfezar in 1383, which Timur put down
withexemplaryviolence.Saru ‘Adel likewise lastedonlya short time,
as he quickly used Timur’s absence in the east to appropriate local
taxes and build up his troops. He was suspected of ambitions in
Azarbaijan and killed in 788/138635. Eskandare Sheykhi lasted lon
ger, but in 1403 he attempted independence in the homelands Timur
hadreturnedtohim,andwasagainchasedout36.
If we read the historieswatching for localmilitary actors,wemay
find more continuing political activity than we have previously
thought, even under strong dynasties. As rulers passed through
regions, or governors arrived at their posts, the local leaders and
commanders came to pay their respects, but sometimes their ambi
tions continued to exist. When in 798/1396 Yazd rebelled from the
Timurids, we find a Khorasanian amir who had formerly served the
Mozaffarids, raising to the throne SoltanMohammad b. Abu Sa’id,
descended from a servitor of the Mongol family of ‘Abdallah
b. Mulay, who had for a while achieved independence in Raqa and
HalvaninsouthernQohestan37.
It ispossible thatweshouldsee the influenceof localmilitarymen
also in the rebellion of Shahrokh’s grandson MohammadSoltan in
Isfahan and Fars in 14456,which is usually ascribed to an invitation
issued to him by the city notables and ulama of Isfahan. What was
happening here was probably something more widespread; we see in
14423 the beginnings of restiveness under an ill and aging ruler.The
disturbances started with local rulers, first in the Caspian region with
the king of Rostamdar, and then inHamadan,whose commanderwas
the one local leader refusing to recognize SoltanMohammad’s
appointment as governor over the region. SoltanMohammad himself
soon showed signs of independence which roused Shahrokh to
remonstrance. When in 14456 the Isfahan notables looked for sup
port against Shahrokh’s tax agents, SoltanMohammad was a likely
ally, and indeed he was quick to accept their invitation.What is stri
king about this uprising is how fast it developed beyond Isfahan.
When SoltanMohammad sent out envoys to regional notables and
governors, he received a wide positive response. Money and young

MilitaryManpowerinLateMongolandTimuridIran/53
men began to flock to him from all over Iraq and even from some of
the Qara Qoyunlu, so that he soon had a sizeable army, containing
apparently Chaghatay, local and foreign troops. Thus at the end of
Shahrokh’s reign, as at the beginning ofTimur’s, themilitary popula
tionofIranwasmixed,volatileandreadyforadventure38.
Conclusion
In assessing the political map of Iran under the Mongols and the
Timuridswe have to consider the Iranian lands as containing amixed
population of militarily and politically active people. The local mili
tary class of Iran fails to appear prominently in the dynastic histories,
but we are used to making up for this in the case of Sufi sheykhs,
ulama and urban notables, all of whom have other sources which
informus of their importance. I suggest that despite the silence of the
sources, the composition and activity of military elites was a signifi
cant factor which wemust explicate if we are fully to understand the
relations between government and society, between Turco
Mongolian and Iranian populations, between city and village. It is
possible that most local amirs stayed in one small region for genera
tions serving whatever rulers controlled the area and thus provided a
source of stability and continuity. Many of those who appear in the
histories however had a different character and function. These were
ambitious andmobilemen,moving from one ruler and region to ano
ther, and encouraging adventurism in the dynasties they served. We
must regard the regional military population as a changing one, fre
quently incorporating new figures. This was not a passive force, and
in considering what such conquering dynasties as the Timurids inhe
ritedwhen they tookover Iran, it is important to recognize that itwas
a region with a population of mixed ethnic origin, Iranian, Mongol
andTurk, tribal, agricultural and urban, nomad and settled, all used to
fighting together, whether as allies or as enemies. Even if we cannot
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